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Introduction
Justice Ivan Cleveland Rand, for whom this lecture is named, served as a judge in the 
Supreme Court of Canada for some sixteen years, between 1943 and 1959. During that 
period, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down only three reported decisions 
relating to the rights of aboriginal peoples.1 In two of these cases, Justice Rand 
delivered separate opinions.2 Some passages that appear there are worth pondering.
In the St. Ann’s Island Shooting and Fishing Club case,3 decided in 1950, Justice 
Rand stated with respect to a provision of the Indian Act:4
The language of the statute embodies the accepted view that these aborigines are, in 
effect, wards of the state, whose care and welfare are a political trust of the highest 
obligation. For that reason, every such dealing with their privileges must bear the 
imprint of Governmental approval...
Six years later, in the case of Francis v. The Queen,5 Justice Rand remarked with 
respect to a clause favouring Indians in the Jay Treaty of 1794:
Appreciating fully the obligation of good faith toward these wards of the state [i.e. the 
Indians], there can be no doubt that the conditions constituting the raison d ’etre of the 
clause were and have been considered such as would in foreseeable time disappear.... 
Whether, then, the time of its expiration has been reached or not it is not here necessary 
to decide; it is sufficient to say that there is no legislation now in force implementing 
the stipulation.
‘Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. This paper is based on 
the text of the Ivan C. Rand Memorial Lecture at the Faculty of Law, University of New 
Brunswick (Fredericton), April 14, 1999.
1 Miller v. The King [1950] 1 D.L.R. 513 (S.C.C.); St. Ann's Island Shooting and Fishing Club 
Ltd. v. The King [1950] 2 D.L.R. 225 (S.C.C.); and Francis v. The Queen (1956), 3 D.L.R. 641 
(S.C.C.). For a complete collection of reported aboriginal cases decided during Justice Rand’s 
term, see B. Slattery & S. Stelck, eds., Canadian Native Law Cases (Saskatoon: University of 
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1987) which covers the period 1931-1959.
2In the third case, Miller v. The King [1950] 1 D.L.R. 513 (S.C.C.), Rand J. concurred in the 
judgment of Kerwin J.
3Supra, note 1, at 232.
4The Court was considering the version of the Act found in R.S.C. 1906, c. 81.
5Supra, note 1, at 650.
It is a striking fact that in both these passages Justice Rand affirms that the Indians 
were considered “wards of the state”. Wards are people — often minors — who have 
been placed under the care of a guardian on the grounds that they are incapable of 
handling their own affairs. The implication is that Indians are unable to manage their 
own affairs, which the state consequently manages on their behalf. Now, true guardians 
can usually be held legally accountable for their actions. However, with Indians, the 
case was considered to be different. So, while Justice Rand notes that the government 
had trust obligations toward the Indians, he describes those obligations as a “political 
trust”— apparently assuming that the obligations were not enforceable in the law courts 
but only before the tribunals of morality and politics. According to this view, the rights 
and privileges of aboriginal peoples were generally held at the discretion of the Crown, 
whose actions were not reviewable in the courts. The relationship between the Crown 
and aboriginal peoples was governed not by law but by political and moral 
considerations. The history of Canada since 1763 suggests that the constraints of mere 
morality and politics did not serve aboriginal peoples very well.
In fairness to Justice Rand, it is not clear from these passages that he was doing 
much more than reciting the standard view of the status of aboriginal peoples, without 
necessarily endorsing it. For he was, of course, a man of larger views and a declared 
opponent of arbitrary state action. In the famous case of Roncarelli v. Duplessis,6 
decided in 1959, he held that, where the Premier and Attorney-General of a Province 
used his powers deliberately to destroy the vital interests of a citizen, the Premier could 
be sued personally for damages. Justice Rand stated in no uncertain terms that if the 
courts were to allow government according to law to be superseded by the arbitrary 
actions of public officers, this “would signalize the beginning of disintegration of the 
rule of law as a fundamental postulate of our constitutional structure.”7
Since the time of Justice Rand, we have seen the gradual emergence of the view that 
the relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples is governed by the rule of 
law, not simply that of politics. As such, the rights of aboriginal peoples are protected 
by the courts and cannot be superseded by the arbitrary actions of public officers.
This evolution in legal understanding has proceeded at two different but related 
levels. Starting with the Calder decision8 in 1973, and continuing with the decisions in
6[1959] S.C.R. 121.
Ibid. at 142.
%Calder\. British Columbia (A.G.) [1973] S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.).
Guerin,9 Simon,10 Sparrow,11 Sioui,12 Van der Peetn and Delgamuukw,14 the Supreme 
Court has gradually elaborated a comprehensive scheme of aboriginal and treaty rights 
that recognizes them as legal rights and not merely rights held at the pleasure of the 
Crown. This transformation in our legal understanding was highlighted by Chief Justice 
Dickson and Justice La Forest in their joint decision in the Sparrow case15 in 1990. 
They remarked:
For many years, the rights of the Indians to their aboriginal lands -  certainly as legal 
rights -  were virtually ignored. ... For fifty years after the publication of Clement’s The 
Law o f the Canadian Constitution (3rd ed. 1916), there was a virtual absence of 
discussion of any kind of Indian rights to land even in academic literature. By the late 
1960s, aboriginal claims were not even recognized by the federal government as having 
any legal status.... In the same general period, the James Bay development by Quebec 
Hydro was originally initiated without regard to the rights of the Indians who lived 
there, even though these were expressly protected by a constitutional instrument;... It 
took a number of judicial decisions and notably the Calder case in this Court (1973) to 
prompt a reassessment of the position being taken by government.16
This judicial trend has also been reinforced by the constitutional entrenchment of 
existing aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35(1), Constitution Act, 1982.17 This 
section states:
The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby 
recognized and affirmed.
Once again, in the Sparrow case18 Chief Justice Dickson and Justice La Forest 
commented on the profound significance of this section, as the culmination of a long 
and difficult struggle in both the political forum and the courts, quoting a passage from 
Professor Noel Lyon:
[T]he context of 1982 is surely enough to tell us that this is not just a codification of the 
case law on aboriginal rights that had accumulated by 1982. Section 35 calls for a just 
settlement for aboriginal peoples. It renounces the old rules of the game under which
9Guenn v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (S.C.C.).
l0Simon v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387 (S.C.C.).
"R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.).
nR. v. Sioui [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (S.C.C.).
13R. v. Van derPeet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.).
uDelgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.).
lsSupra, note 11.
[6Ibid. at 1103-04.
17Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
lsSupra, note 11, at 1105-06.
the Crown established courts of law and denied those courts the authority to question 
sovereign claims made by the Crown.19
In my remarks today, I will deal with the subject of aboriginal title, focussing on 
aspects particularly relevant to the Provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.20 
First, I will review the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada governing 
the proof of aboriginal title. I will then consider the judicial tests governing 
extinguishment of aboriginal title. Finally, I will turn my attention to the manner in 
which the New Brunswick courts have dealt with question in the recent Peter Paul 
case.21
Proof of Aboriginal Title
Where an aboriginal group asserts aboriginal title to certain lands, an inquiry will focus 
on two matters. First, was the aboriginal group (or its predecessor-in-title) vested with 
aboriginal title to those lands at the time the Crown acquired sovereignty? Second, was 
this aboriginal title extinguished in the period between the date of sovereignty and the 
date when its existence is sought to be demonstrated?22 The party asserting the 
existence of aboriginal title bears the burden of proving that the aboriginal group (or a 
predecessor-in-title) held aboriginal title at the date of Crown sovereignty. By contrast, 
once the existence of aboriginal title is established, the burden of proving that it was 
extinguished falls on the party opposing the claim.23 In this section, we will deal with 
the proof of aboriginal title. The question of extinguishment is considered in the next 
section.
19Noel Lyon, “An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation” ( 1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L. J. 95 at 100.
“In early colonial times, the lands now comprised in the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia fell within the asserted boundaries of the British colony of Nova Scotia, so that for present 
purposes the two Provinces may conveniently be considered together. This paper does not deal 
with the position of aboriginal title in the Atlantic Provinces of Prince Edward Island and 
Newfoundland, whose histories are somewhat distinct.
2'R. v. Peter Paul [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 221 (N.B. Prov. Ct.), afFd R. v. Peter Paul [1998] 1
C.N.L.R. 209 (N.B.Q.B.), rev’d R. v. Peter Paul [1998] 3 C.N.L.R. 221 (N.B.C.A.).
form ally the latter is the date when the dispute arises, however in some cases it may be an 
earlier date, as for example where an aboriginal group claims compensation for a statutory taking 
of aboriginal title at a previous period.
*R v. Sparrow, supra, note 11, at 1099, adopting the rule laid down by Hall J. in Calder v. 
British Columbia (A.G.), supra, note 8, at 404.
In Delgamuukw,™ the Supreme Court holds that in order to establish aboriginal title 
an aboriginal group must satisfy three criteria:
• The land must have been occupied prior to Crown sovereignty.
• That occupation must have been exclusive.
• If present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation prior to Crown 
sovereignty, there must be continuity between present and pre-sovereignty 
occupation.
The first two criteria, taken together, relate to what we may call the requirement of 
historical occupation. This requirement must be satisfied in all cases where a group 
asserts aboriginal title. By contrast, the third criterion only applies in cases where 
present occupation is relied on as proof of pre-sovereignty occupation. We may call 
this the requirement of continuing connection. The following sections are devoted 
to these two requirements.
Historical Occupation
To establish aboriginal title an aboriginal group must prove that it (or a predecessor-in- 
title) had exclusive occupation of the land at the date the Crown gained sovereignty. 
This requirement has three distinct elements: (a) occupation; (b) the date of Crown 
sovereignty; and (c) exclusivity. We will consider these elements.separately.
i. Occupation
In Delgamuukw, the Court holds that the aboriginal presence on the land at the time of 
sovereignty must amount to occupation. But what does occupation consist of? Two 
different positions were advanced before the Court. The governmental parties argued 
that aboriginal title arises only where there is physical occupation of the land. The 
aboriginal parties submitted that occupation may be established, at least in part, by 
reference to aboriginal law. In the first case, aboriginal title would reflect certain 
tangible realities that existed at the time of sovereignty— concrete practices, alterations 
in the physical environment, structures and other material signs of occupation— which 
could presumably be detected by an attentive outside observer. In the second case, 
aboriginal title would reflect conceptions of land and territory under aboriginal laws and 
customs, which would require the court to look at the matter through the eyes of the 
aboriginal group in question and to take into account certain immaterial realities.25 The 
difference between the two approaches becomes clearer when applied to certain remote 
or little-visited places, such as the peaks of mountains or inaccessible gorges. Under
uSupra, note 14, at 1097. For exposition purposes, I have reversed the order of the last two 
requirements as found in the judgment.
25Ibid. at 1099.
the first approach, it would be difficult to establish aboriginal title to such places 
because there would be little in the way of physical occupation to appeal to. However, 
under the second approach, a group could show that under aboriginal law those places 
formed part of the communal territory, even if, given the inhospitable or remote nature 
of the terrain, that outlook did not give rise to much tangible physical activity.
Faced with these two arguments, the Court in Delgamuukw adopts a comprehensive 
approach, holding that both physical occupation and the aboriginal perspective on land 
should be taken into account, with equal weight being given to each.26 While physical 
presence on the land is clearly relevant to establishing occupation, so also is the outlook 
of the aboriginal group in question. That outlook can be gleaned in part, but not 
exclusively, from the traditional laws of the group:
As a result, if, at the time of sovereignty, an aboriginal society had laws in relation to 
land, those laws would be relevant to establishing the occupation of lands which are the 
subject of a claim for aboriginal title. Relevant laws might include, but are not limited 
to, a land tenure system or laws governing land use.27
With respect to the first matter, the Court observes that at common law the fact of 
physical occupation is proof of possession, which in turn will ground title to the land.28 
Physical occupation may be established in a variety of ways, including:
• the construction of dwellings;
• the cultivation and enclosure of fields; and
• the regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or exploitation of 
resources.29
The third category is clearly an important one in this context, because many 
aboriginal groups in Canada originally used their lands mainly for hunting, trapping, 
fishing and gathering. In his separate opinion in Delgamuukw, La Forest J. stresses that 
aboriginal occupancy refers not only to the use of village sites or other permanently 
settled areas but also to the use of adjacent lands and even remote territories to pursue
™Ibid. at 1099-1100; citing Baker Lake (Hamlet oj) v. Minister o f Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development [1980] 1 F.C. 518 (F.C.T.D.) at 559, 561 and R. v. Van derPeet, supra, note 13, 
at 546-47,551.
27Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1100.
njbid. at 1100-01; citing K. McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989) at 73; E. H. Bum, Cheshire and Bum's Modem Law o f Real Property, 14th ed. (London: 
Butterworths, 1988) at 28; R. E. Megarry & H. W. R. Wade, The Law o f Real Property, 4th ed. 
(London: Stevens, 1975) at 1006.
29Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1101, citing McNeil, Common Law 
Aboriginal Title, supra, note 28, at 201-02.
a traditional mode of life.30 He argues that this conclusion is supported by the terms of 
ihe Royal Proclamation o f1763,31 which, although not the sole source of aboriginal title 
in Canada, bears witness to British policy towards aboriginal peoples, based on respect 
for their right to occupy their ancestral lands. La Forest J. observes that the 
Proclamation reserved vast tracts of land for aboriginal peoples and that these tracts 
were by no means limited to villages or permanent settlements but were characterized 
more generally as “Hunting Grounds” and “for the use of the said Indians”. He 
concludes that under the Proclamation's terms, which were applied in principle to 
aboriginal peoples across the country, aboriginal peoples were entitled to possess these 
lands and not to be molested or disturbed in their possession.32
In determining whether physical occupation has been proven, the Court in 
Delgamuukw adopts the view that “one must take into account the group’s size, manner 
of life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the lands 
claimed”.33 Obviously, then, we should not expect the occupation patterns of hunters 
and fishers to conform to the patterns of farmers or ranchers. Neither should we expect 
that lands should be used to their maximum potential with the best available technology. 
The fact that a tract of land could be turned to profitable agricultural use does not mean 
that a hunting group that confines itself to exploiting the land’s renewable resources 
fails to “occupy” the land.34
However, physical occupancy is not the only relevant factor. According to 
Delgamuukw, a court also needs to take into account the aboriginal perspective on the 
occupation of their lands. This perspective can be ascertained in part from the 
traditional laws of the group, such as its land tenure system or rules governing land 
use.35 In effect, then, the Court stresses the need to remain open to the aboriginal
30Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1131.
31 Royal Proclamation o f October 7, 1763, in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal 
Proclamations Relating to America (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society, 1911), 
212.
32Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1131-32; citing R. v. Wesley [1932] 4
D.L.R. 774 (Alta. S.C., A.D.) at 787, and R  v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. 150 (N.W.T.C.A.), 
affirmed in Sikyea v. The Queen [1964] S.C.R. 642 (S.C.C.).
* Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1101, quoting B. Slattery, "Understanding 
Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 758.
MSee Mitchel v. United States, 9 Peters 711 (U.S.S.C. 1835) at 746, where Baldwin J. stated that 
under the law applying in the Crown’s American colonies in 1763: “Indian possession or 
occupation was considered with reference to their habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds 
were as much in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites; and their rights to its 
exclusive enjoyment in their own way and for their own purposes were as much respected...”
35Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1100.
outlook on the nature of their relationship with the land, rather than applying rigid 
criteria thât reflect conceptions, values and priorities alien to the group concerned.
In his separate opinion, Justice La Forest makes some interesting observations on 
the question of occupancy. He notes that an aboriginal group claiming aboriginal title 
must obviously specify the area occupied. However, when dealing with vast tracts of 
land, it may be impossible to identify the boundaries of the area occupied with any great 
precision. Nevertheless, this failing should not preclude recognition of a general right 
of occupation of the affected lands. The delineation of exact territorial limits is a matter 
that can be settled by subsequent negotiations between the aboriginal claimants and the 
government.36 In other words, where an aboriginal group can prove that it occupied a 
certain territoiy but is less successful in demonstrating its precise boundaries, a Court 
may recognize the group’s aboriginal title and leave the delineation of accurate 
boundaries to the negotiating process.
ii. The date of Crown sovereignty
The claimant group must show that it occupied the lands in question at the date of the 
Crown’s sovereignty — what we will call the “threshold date”. However, the Court’s 
explanation of this criterion is ambiguous. Is it the date when the Crown first asserted 
sovereignty or rather the date when it actually acquired sovereignty? The Court’s 
language allows for either interpretation.37 The issue is far from academic. From the 
early days of European contact, Great Britain, France and other imperial states advanced 
overlapping claims to enormous territories that they had not even explored, much less 
brought under their control. From time to time, they also signed treaties with each other 
that acknowledged and adjusted some of these claims. While these treaties were 
binding on the signatories, they could not affect the rights of third parties such as 
aboriginal peoples. So, the date that Crown sovereignty was actually acquired was 
often substantially later than the date it was first asserted — possibly as much as 
several centuries in some parts of Canada.38
“Ibid. at 1128-29.
37The Court’s initial formulation of the criterion states that “the land must have been occupied 
prior to sovereigntÿ\ibid. at 1097; emphasis added). The Court then speaks in several places of 
the time when the Crown asserted sovereignty over the land {ibid. at 1097-99). It closes its 
discussion by reiterating the trial court’s finding that British sovereignty over British Columbia 
was “conclusively established’ by the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846 (ibid. at 1099; emphasis 
added).
38This depends in part on whether these early claims are construed as full territorial claims, as 
“speculative grants”, or as assertions of exclusive spheres of influence; see discussion in B. 
Slattery, The Land Rights o f Indigenous Canadian Peoples, As Affected by the Crown's 
Acquisition o f Their Territories (D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1979; reprint, Saskatoon: 
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979) at 66-125.
In attempting to resolve this issue, it is helpful to distinguish between (1) the legal 
event consisting of the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and (2) the evidence relating 
to that question. As for the first point, it is submitted that the threshold date for 
aboriginal title is established by the legal event marking the Crown’s acquisition of 
sovereignty vis-a-vis the particular aboriginal people in question rather than as against 
other European states or the United States. As the Court observes, since aboriginal title 
is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title, it does not make sense to speak of such a 
burden existing before the underlying title itself came into existence.39 However, the 
Crown would not gain a genuine underlying title to lands held by an aboriginal people 
until it actually gained sovereignty over that people, no matter what agreements or 
understandings on the point existed with other colonial powers. So long as an 
aboriginal people was actually independent, the Crown’s claims would remain a fiction.
As for the second point, in ascertaining the date of sovereignty, it is clear that a 
court should take into account all the available evidence. That evidence will include 
any Crown assertions of sovereignty, but it will also embrace a range of other 
significant material, including treaties with the aboriginal people in question, acts of 
conquest, settlements and tangible manifestations of governmental control. In this 
context, a unilateral Crown claim of sovereignty is a relevant factor, but it is far from 
being conclusive. Much will depend on the history of Crown dealings with the 
particular aboriginal people in question, as seen in the larger political context.
What happens when an aboriginal group occupied certain lands at the time of 
Crown sovereignty but afterwards moved to another area, whether voluntarily or due 
to the pressures of war, internal conflict, encroaching settlement or environmental 
conditions? May the group gain aboriginal title to the lands that it moves to? Does the 
group lose its title to the lands it occupied at the threshold date? We will consider these 
questions in turn.
At first glance, the requirement that occupation must exist at the time of Crown 
sovereignty appears to prevent an aboriginal group from gaining title to lands to which 
it migrates after sovereignty. However, on closer consideration, the matter is not so 
clear-cut Suppose, for example, that the group moves to lands held by another 
aboriginal group. Here it can be argued that the migrating group may inherit the title 
of its predecessors-in-possession, by virtue of conquest, cession, merger or exchange. 
Some cryptic remarks by the Court seem to allow for this possibility. After stating the 
requirement of occupation at the time of sovereignty, the Court notes:
39Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1098.
This is not to say that circumstances subsequent to sovereignty may never be relevant 
to title or compensation; this might be the case, for example, where native bands have 
been dispossessed of traditional lands after sovereignty.40
Once again, Justice La Forest throws an interesting light on the question. While he 
agrees that the time of sovereignty is more appropriate than the time of first contact as 
a threshold date for aboriginal title, he suggests that the date of sovereignty may not be 
the only relevant time to consider. He cites two sorts of cases. The first is where an 
aboriginal group occupied certain lands at the time of Crown sovereignty but 
subsequently moved to another place, where it has remained to the present day. The 
move may have been prompted by clashes with settlers or by natural causes such as 
flooding. In this sort of case, the existence of aboriginal title should not be denied just 
because the relocation occurred post-sovereignty. Rather, La Forest J. argues, 
“continuity may still exist where the present occupation of one area is connected to the 
pre-sovereignty occupation of another area.”41 The second case arises where lands that 
were occupied by one aboriginal group at the time of Crown sovereignty subsequently 
passed to the claimant aboriginal group by such means as conquest, cession, merger or 
exchange. Here, La Forest J. states, the occupancy of the claimant group may be 
connected to the occupancy of the initial group, so that occupation extending back to 
the date of Crown sovereignty may be established in this manner.42
To summarize, La Forest J. suggests that a claimant aboriginal group may satisfy 
the requirement of occupation at sovereignty in any one of three ways:
1. proof that it occupied the lands claimed at sovereignty;
2. proof that its occupation of the lands claimed is connected with its occupation of 
other lands at sovereignty; or
3. proof that its occupation of the lands claimed is connected with another aboriginal 
group’s occupation of those lands at sovereignty.
Let us turn now to a distinct but related question. Does a group that ceases to 
occupy lands held at sovereignty lose title to those lands? The answer to this question 
may depend on the circumstances. In particular, a group ousted from its lands by 
governmental act or settler encroachment might be in a stronger position than a group 
that leaves of its own free will. For simplicity, we will set aside such complicating 
factors as forcible dispossession and confine our discussion to the case where the group 
leaves its lands voluntarily. Here the answer seems to depend on the answer to the 
question just considered. If we hold that aboriginal title arises exclusively from
«Ibid. at 1099.
"Ibid. at 1130.
*2Ibid. at 1130-31, citing Slatteiy, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights”, supra, note 33, at 759.
occupation at sovereignty and may not be gained by occupation in the post-sovereignty 
period, it seems to follow that continuing occupation is not necessary in order to 
maintain aboriginal title in the post-sovereignty period. By contrast, if we hold that 
aboriginal title may be gained by occupation in the post-sovereignty period, it seems 
likely that it may also be lost by failure to occupy. The opinion of Lamer C.J. in 
Delgamuukw sheds little light on these matters. However, it seems implicit in the 
reasoning of LaForest J. that a migrating group that gains title to lands occupied post­
sovereignty would lose title to any lands occupied at sovereignty.
iii. Exclusivity
A claimant group must show that its occupation of the land was exclusive.43 This 
requirement mirrors the fact that aboriginal title imports the right to exclusive use and 
occupation of the land. Nevertheless, the Court warns that this requirement must be 
applied with caution and in light of the concrete context of the aboriginal society in 
question. The fact that other aboriginal groups frequented the land or were present on 
it does not neoessarily mean that the claimant group’s occupation was not exclusive. 
All that is needed, says the Chief Justice, is “the intention and capacity to retain 
exclusive control”.44 The mere presence of trespassers will not negate title where the 
claimant group intended and attempted to enforce their exclusive rights. Indeed, as 
Professor Kent McNeil has observed, the presence of other aboriginal groups on the 
land might actually reinforce the claimant group’s title, because where “others were 
allowed access upon request, the very fact that permission was asked for and given 
would be further evidence of the group’s exclusive control” 45
In other cases, two or more groups may have joint title to lands, arising from their 
shared exclusive occupancy of those lands. This situation arises, for example, where 
two aboriginal nations live together on a certain tract of land and recognize each other’s 
right to live there but deny the right of anyone else to live on the land. In such 
instances, shared exclusive possession means the right to exclude all others except those 
with whom possession of the land is shared.46
The Court reiterates that, if an aboriginal group can show that it occupied a certain 
tract of land but did not do so exclusively, it can always show that it had site-specific 
aboriginal rights short of aboriginal title. In other words, while exclusive occupation
43Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1104.
"Ibid., quoting McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra, note 28, at 204.
45Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, quoting McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal 
Title, supra, note 28, at 204.
46Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1105-06, citing United States v. Santa Fe 
Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339 (U.S.S.C. 1941). See also La Forest J.’s comments in 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1129.
is an essential prerequisite for aboriginal title, it is not a prerequisite for site-specific 
rights. Consider, for example, the case where a certain area was used for hunting by 
several aboriginal groups, however the groups did not have exclusive title to the area 
either singly or jointly. In this case, aboriginal title could not arise because the crucial 
element of exclusivity would be absent. However, the individual groups might each 
have a site-specific right to hunt in the area. Since the rights are non-exclusive, their 
holders presumably could not prevent outside groups from using the land to hunt as 
well. However, the rights would enjoy constitutional protection under section 35(1) as 
aboriginal rights.47
In this example, the hypothetical site-specific rights are non-exclusive; that is, they 
do not operate so as to exclude other groups from the area in question. The question 
arises whether site-specific rights are intrinsically non-exclusive or whether this is a 
matter for proof in each case. The Court does not explicitly address this question, 
however its discussion supports certain inferences.
In a case where a group has the right to use certain lands in a manner that excludes 
all other groups from using those lands for any purposes whatsoever, that right 
probably amounts to aboriginal title rather than a site-specific right. For example, 
where it can be shown that (a) a group had the exclusive right to hunt in a certain area, 
and (b) this right barred other groups from using the area for any purposes whatsoever, 
it seems likely that the case for aboriginal title has been made out. The exclusivity of 
the right strongly supports the inference that the group has a right to the land itself. 
Nevertheless it is perhaps possible to envisage a case where a group has an exclusive 
right to use lands for a specific purpose but the existence of that right does not prevent 
other groups from using the land for other purposes, so long as these purposes are 
compatible with the first group’s right.
In conclusion, the question cannot be settled in the abstract but must depend on the 
evidence of a particular group’s activities in each case. As the Court remarks, such a 
flexible approach accords with the general principle that the common law should evolve 
to recognize aboriginal rights “as they were recognized by either de facto practice or by 
the aboriginal system of governance.”48
Continuing Connection
In Delgamuukw, the Chief Justice concedes that it may be very difficult for an 
aboriginal group to prove that it occupied certain lands at the date of Crown 
sovereignty, given that extensive written records are not generally available for such 
early periods. In some cases the task may be almost impossible. Yet to set a standard
A1Ibid. at 1106-07.
«Ibid. at 1106.
of proof so high that it cannot ordinarily be met is obviously unfair. How should this 
dilemma be resolved? The Court holds that in view of the difficulty in obtaining 
evidence of pre-Crown occupation, an aboriginal group may provide evidence of 
present occupation as proof of pre-sovereignty occupation.49
In other words, proof of present occupation gives rise to a presumption of fact that 
this occupation existed at sovereignty. By way of parallel, in the Simon case50 the 
Supreme Court held that evidence that the appellant was a current member of the 
Shubenacadie Band of Micmac Indians living in the same area as the original Micmac 
tribe was sufficient to prove the appellant’s connection to a treaty signed by a Chief of 
the Shubenacadie Micmac tribe in 1752. Chief Justice Dickson commented:
True, this evidence is not conclusive proof that the appellant is a direct descendant of 
the Micmac Indians covered by the Treaty of 1752. It must, however, be sufficient, for 
otherwise no Micmac Indian would be able to establish descendancy. The Micmacs did 
not keep written records. Micmac traditions are largely oral in nature. To impose an 
impossible burden of proof would, in effect, render nugatory any right to hunt that a 
present day Shubenacadie Micmac Indian would otherwise be entitled to invoke based 
on this Treaty.51
In Delgamuukw, the Court holds that where a group relies on present occupation as 
proof of pre-Crown occupation, it must show a measure of continuity between present 
and past occupation. It emphasizes that the continuity need not be unbroken.52 In some 
cases, an aboriginal group’s occupation of the land may have been disrupted for a 
certain period, perhaps due to colonial interference. To apply the requirement of 
continuing connection too strictly would risk undermining the purposes of s. 35(1) by 
perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hands of 
colonizers who failed to respect aboriginal land rights.53 Nevertheless, as the High 
Court of Australia held in the Mabo case,54 there must be substantial maintenance of the 
connection between the claimant group and the land. For the connection to be 
maintained, the group’s occupation of the land need not have remained the same. To 
the contrary, the nature of the occupation will likely have changed, as the group adapted
*9Ibid. at 1102, referring to the earlier discussion in R. v. Van derPeet, supra, note 13, at 555-56.
»Simon v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387 (S.C.C.).
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i2Delgamuukw\. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1103, citing/?, v. Van derPeet,supra, note 
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53Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1103, quoting R. v. Côté [1996] 3 S.C.R. 
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its mode of life to new circumstances and opportunities. This fact will not ordinarily 
rule out a claim of aboriginal title.55
It must be said that the Court’s treatment of this topic is less than satisfactory. On 
the one hand, the Court holds that present occupation may serve as evidence of pre- 
Crown occupation. This approach tacitly invokes a presumption of connection 
between the past and the present On the other hand, the Court also states that in such 
instances a group must prove a connection between present and past occupation, which 
seems at odds with the presumption just laid down. Evidence of present occupation will 
serve as proof of pre-Crown occupation only where little independent evidence of the 
pre-Crown situation exists. In such instances, how will it be possible to prove an 
historical connection between the past and the present, since it is precisely the absence 
of evidence about the past that forces reliance on present occupation as proof? The 
possibility of proving an historical connection is usually highest where there is reliable 
historical evidence as to the pre-sovereignty situation. Yet, according to the Court’s 
formulation, this is precisely the case where proof of continuity is not required.
Perhaps what the Court means is the following. Where independent evidence of 
historical occupation is lacking or insufficient, an aboriginal group may tender evidence 
of its present occupation in order to fill gaps in the historical record. However, in doing 
this, the group has to show some connection between its present occupation and the 
past situation. In other words, contemporary evidence can be used as a guide to the past 
only when it is supported by a certain amount of historical evidence establishing its 
reliability in this context. Obviously, it is not in every case that contemporary practices 
provide a reliable guide to the past. Nevertheless, the Court is willing to accept 
contemporary evidence for these purposes, subject only to the proviso that there be 
some evidence as to its reliability as a guide to the historical situation.
Extinguishment
As seen earlier, the party asserting the existence of aboriginal title bears the burden of 
proving that the aboriginal group in question (or a predecessor-in-title) held aboriginal 
title at the date of Crown sovereignty. However, once the existence of aboriginal title 
is established, the burden of proving that it was extinguished falls on the party opposing 
the claim. The latter rule was first articulated by Justice Hall in the Calder case,56 where 
he stated that once aboriginal title is established, it is presumed to continue until the
53Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra, note 14, at 1103.
s6Calderv. British Columbia (A. G.), supra, note 8, at 401 -04. Hall J. was dissenting in the result
but not on this point.
contrary is proven. Citing a number of authorities, including the statement of Viscount 
Haldane in the Privy Council decision of Amodu Tijani,57 Hall J. Went on to conclude:
It would, accordingly, appear to be beyond question that the onus of proving that the 
Sovereign intended to extinguish the Indian title lies on the respondent and that 
intention must be “clear and plain”.58
This rule was adopted by a unanimous Supreme Court in the Sparrow case.59 
Speaking for the Court, Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. quoted the above passage from 
Justice Hall’s judgment and went on to hold that the Sovereign’s intention must be clear 
and plain if it is to extinguish an aboriginal right. Applying this criterion, they 
concluded that in the case at hand “the Crown has failed to discharge its burden of 
proving extinguishment.”60
Prior to the enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, there were a 
variety of ways in which aboriginal title could conceivably be extinguished. Here we 
will consider only one of these possible ways, which is particularly germane to our 
discussion, namely the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over a territory.61
Under British colonial law, the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over an 
inhabited territory was governed by a principle of continuity. Under this principle, the 
property rights of the local inhabitants were presumed to continue undisturbed, in the 
absence of some definite act of expropriation by the Crown performed in the course of 
acquisition. The principle of continuity was laid down by the Privy Council in the 
Amodu Tijani case, which dealt with a cession of territory to the Crown by the King of 
Lagos in 1861.62 Under the terms of the treaty, the King ceded to the Crown the port 
and island of Lagos, with all the rights, profits, territories and appurtenances belonging 
thereto. In construing the treaty, Viscount Haldane stated:
No doubt there was a cession to the British Crown, along with the sovereignty, of the 
radical or ultimate title to the land, in the new colony, but this cession appears to have 
been made on the footing that the rights of property of the inhabitants were to be folly
57“The original native right was a communal right, and it must be presumed to have continued to 
exist unless the contrary is established by the context or circumstances.”; Amodu Tijani v. 
Secretary o f Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 A.C. 399 (P.C.) at 410; quoted in Colder v. British 
Columbia (A.G.), supra, note 8, at 402.
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respected. This principle is a usual one under British policy and law when such 
occupations take place. The general words of the cession are construed as having 
related primarily to sovereign rights only.... A mere change in sovereignty is not to be 
presumed as meant to disturb rights of private owners; and the general terms of a 
cession are prima facie to be construed accordingly. The introduction of the system of 
Crown grants which was made subsequently must be regarded as having been brought 
about mainly, if not exclusively, for conveyancing purposes, and not with a view to 
altering substantive titles already existing.63
This approach was adopted by Hall J. in the Calder case:64
The appellants rely on the presumption that the British Crown intended to respect native 
rights; therefore, when the Nishga people came under British sovereignty... they were 
entitled to assert, as a legal right, their Indian title. It being a legal right, it could not 
thereafter be extinguished except by surrender to the Crown or by competent legislative 
authority, and then only by specific legislation.65
The principle of continuity was reiterated by Dickson J. in the Guerin case.66 He 
noted that in Calder the Supreme Court recognized aboriginal title as a legal right 
derived from the Indians’ historic occupation and possession of their lands. Although 
the Calder court split three-three on the issue of whether the Nishga Nation’s aboriginal 
title to their ancient territories had been extinguished by British Columbia enactments, 
six judges in the case were in agreement that aboriginal title existed in Canada, at least 
where it had not been extinguished by appropriate legislative action. In this respect, 
Calder was consistent with the position of Chief Justice Marshall of the United States 
Supreme Court in the cases of Johnson v. M ’lntosh67 and Worcester v. Georgia,68 where 
he held that the rights of Indians to the lands they traditionally occupied prior to 
European colonization both predated and survived the claims to sovereignty made by 
various European nations in North America. Although the claimant nation gained the 
ultimate title to the land claimed, the Indians’ rights of occupancy and possession 
remained unaffected. Dickson J. went on to note that the principle that a change in 
sovereignty over a territory does not in general affect the presumptive title of the 
inhabitants was approved by the Privy Council in the Amodu Tijani case. He concluded 
that this principle supports the assumption implicit in Calder that Indian title is an
“Ibid. at 407-08.
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61 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheaton 543 (U.S.S.C. 1823).
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independent legal right which, although recognized by the Royal Proclamation o f1763, 
nonetheless predates it.69
These, then, are some of the basic principles laid down by the Supreme Court 
governing the proof and extinguishment of aboriginal title. What impact do they have 
on the question of aboriginal title in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia? We will 
consider this matter in the context of the recent Peter Paul case.
The Peter Paul Case
The Peter Paul case began innocuously enough in 1996 with a charge in the New 
Brunswick Provincial Court.70 The accused was Mr. Thomas Peter Paul, a status Indian, 
member of the MicMac nation and resident of the Papineau Reserve. He was charged 
with unlawfully removing timber from Crown lands without a license contrary to the 
Crown Lands and Forests Act of New Brunswick. The Court held that all the essential 
elements of the offence had been proven, leaving only one for debate: namely, whether 
the act was done “unlawfully”. The defence argued that Mr. Peter Paul had not acted 
unlawfully, since he was exempt from the requirement of obtaining a license by reason 
of the fact that he had a treaty right to harvest timber on Crown lands, a right guaranteed 
by the Constitution Act, 1982.
In a carefully reasoned judgment, Arsenault J. held that the accused’s activities fell 
within the terms of a Treaty concluded at Annapolis Royal on June 4, 1726 with the 
Indian tribes inhabiting the Province of Nova Scotia (which included Indians living in 
territories now comprised in modem New Brunswick). In particular, he held that the 
small-scale harvesting of timber for commercial purposes was a “lawful occasion” 
within the terms of the Treaty, which provided in part as follows:
That the said Indians shall not be molested in their persons hunting fishing and shooting
and planting on their planting ground nor in any other their lawfull occasions.71
Basing himself largely on the terms of section 88 of the Indian Act and the Supreme 
Court decisions in Simon72 and Sioui,73 Justice Arsenault held that the treaty provision 
prevailed over the provincial legislation in question. On the latter point, Justice 
Arsenault was only following a well-trodden path, blazed by the Supreme Court. More 
significant was his ruling that the commercial harvesting of timber was one of the
69Guerin v. The Queen, supra, note 9, at 376-78.
10R. v. Peter Paul [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 221 (N.B. Prov. Ct.).
71Quoted in ibid. at 234.
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“lawful occasions” envisaged in the Treaty of 1726. In sum, despite some references 
to aboriginal rights, the judgment clearly turned on the question of treaty rights.
On appeal to the Court of Queen’s Bench, the case took a new and interesting turn.74 
Justice Turnbull dismissed the appeal and upheld Mr. Peter Paul’s acquittal, however 
he invoked different grounds than those advanced by the trial court. Justice Turnbull 
rejected Justice Arsenault’s conclusion that the right to take timber for commercial 
purposes was one of the “lawful occasions” envisaged by the Treaty of 1726, arguing 
that this right was not contemplated by any of the parties to the treaty.75 Nevertheless, 
after a detailed review of a large mass of historical evidence, he came to three inter­
connected conclusions.
First, Justice Turnbull seemingly inclined to the opinion that the process by which 
the British Crown acquired sovereignty over the old Province of Nova Scotia (which 
included the territory now comprised in New Brunswick) did not affect the existence 
of aboriginal title in the Province, other than to give the Crown an underlying title to the 
soil.
Second, he held that the treaties concluded by the Indians of the Province with the 
Crown in the period following 1713 did not involve a cession of aboriginal title to the 
Crown or a recognition by the Indians that the Crown held a complete title to the soil, 
to the exclusion of aboriginal title. All that the Indians acknowledged was the British 
Crown’s jurisdiction and dominion over the Province.76 Indeed, Justice Turnbull held 
that these treaties, and in particular the treaties concluded in the period 1725-26, 
actually recognized and protected the Indians’ rights to the lands in their possession. 
This right was akin to a usufructuary right; however it was not restricted to personal use 
but amounted to a full-blown right of beneficial ownership, which was subject to the 
overall dominion and jurisdiction of the Crown.77 As a result, the Indians had the right 
to cut trees on all Crown lands in New Brunswick because the restrictions in the Crown 
Lands and Forests Act did not accord primacy to Indian rights and so did not meet the 
guidelines laid down in the Sparrow decision78 for the application of section 35(1), 
Constitution Act, 1982.79
This was, of course, a very significant ruling, one that went far beyond the 
relatively limited ground cited by the trial court. Not surprisingly, the decision was
”R. v. Peter Paul [1998] 1 C.N.L.R. 209 (N.B.Q.B.). 
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appealed to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal.80 In its decision, not only did the 
Court of Appeal reject the reasoning and conclusions advanced by Justice Turnbull in 
the Court of Queen’s Bench, it also rejected the more modest conclusions of Justice 
Arsenault at trial and entered a conviction.
The primary grounds advanced by the Court of Appeal for overturning Justice 
Turnbull’s judgment were that in reaching his conclusions he relied on historical 
materials that were not placed before him by the parties but were unearthed by his own 
historical research. The Court of Appeal concluded that Justice Turnbull was not 
entitled to take judicial notice of the materials in question or to make use of them 
without giving notice to the parties or affording them the opportunity to address 
arguments or present further evidence on relevant points arising from the materials. 
The Court concluded that since the arguments of counsel and the evidence tendered 
were not directed to the issue of aboriginal title, this was not a case in which a court 
could properly assess any claim of aboriginal title to Crown lands in New Brunswick.81
As for the narrower conclusion reached by Justice Arsenault at trial, the Court of 
Appeal noted that Mr. Peter Paul did not put in issue, by Notice of Contention, Justice 
Turnbull’s reversal of that conclusion. Nevertheless, the Court went on to consider and 
reject Justice Arsenault’s interpretation of the Treaty provision on the ground there was 
insufficient historical evidence presented at trial regarding the intentions of the parties 
to the treaty and in particular no evidence to support the conclusion that commercial 
tree harvesting was a “lawful occasion” contemplated by the Treaty.82
This, then, is a short account of the progress of the Peter Paul case through the 
courts of New Brunswick. What can we say about the case and in particular about the 
views expressed by the Court of Appeal?
First, we may note that, although treaty rights have traditionally been of some 
importance to aboriginal peoples in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and no doubt will 
continue to be so, the Peter Paul case demonstrates that in the long run aboriginal title 
constitutes the fundamental underlying issue. In principle, treaty rights are clearly 
distinguishable from aboriginal rights, since their nature and extent depends on the 
specific terms of the treaty in question, as agreed by the parties. However, in practice, 
the line between treaty rights and aboriginal rights is not always clear. Certain treaty 
provisions effectively operate to affirm and protect aboriginal rights already recognized 
at common law. Such rights may be described as “treaty-protected aboriginal rights”. 
The Peter Paul case illustrates this possibility, insofar as Justice Turnbull held in effect
®°Æ v. Peter Paul [1998] 3 C.N.L.R. 221 (N.B.C.A.).
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that the aboriginal title of the accused had been recognized and affirmed in certain 
Indian treaties concluded after the Crown’s succession to France in 1713.
Second, there can be little doubt that the question of aboriginal title in New 
Brunswick is a complex and difficult issue, one that has a profound importance for all 
residents of the Province, including the aboriginal peoples. As such, it merits careful 
and balanced consideration in light of the full array of historical materials and legal 
arguments. So, with respect, the Court of Appeal was surely correct in ruling that it 
would be premature to draw any conclusions on the question of aboriginal title in New 
Brunswick in the absence of complete documentation and legal arguments. The Court 
was also right to hold that Justice Turnbull should not have relied on his own research 
in this area, in particular without giving the parties the opportunity to tender arguments 
on the materials uncovered.
Nevertheless, with respect, we suggest that the Court of Appeal strayed from its 
own principles in prematurely tendering certain opinions on the existence of aboriginal 
title in New Brunswick. In particular, the Court stated that in treaty promises of June 
4,1726 the Indian signatories acknowledged “his Said Majesty’s just titles to this His 
Said Province of Nova Scotia or Acadia”, as well as the fact that His Majesty by the 
“Treaty of Utrecht is become the rightful Possessor of the Province”, and the existence 
of “King Georges Jurisdiction and Dominion Over the T erritories of the Said Province”. 
The Court went on to assert that the Treaty did not create or acknowledge an aboriginal 
title to land:
Indeed, by it, Mr. Peter Paul’s ancestors acknowledge not only the Crown’s jurisdiction 
and dominion over the lands, but also the Crown’s title and rightful possession to the 
lands. Furthermore, Mr. Peter Paul did not lead any evidence that would negate the 
above acknowledgements. Thus, Mr. Peter Paul has not established Aboriginal title to 
the Province of New Brunswick and, therefore, any Indian right derived from 
Aboriginal title to cut timber on Crown or private land in New Brunswick.83
It must be said that the inference that the Court draws from the wording of the Treaty 
of 1726 is not very persuasive. This inference seems to ignore a number of fundamental 
considerations.
First, as seen earlier, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court have authoritatively 
held that there is a basic distinction between sovereignty and property rights. Sovereign 
title to a territory does not necessarily import full property rights to the lands located in 
that territory, any more than property rights to such lands necessarily import sovereign 
title. Sovereignty is, of course, a question of international law. It entails the right to 
rule a certain territory to the exclusion of other international entities. By contrast, 
property rights are primarily a matter of domestic law. They entail the right to occupy 
and use a certain tract of land to the exclusion of other individuals and groups. The fact
S3Ibid. at 231 ; emphasis added.
that the Crown has sovereignty over a certain territoiy in international law does not 
mean that it has complete property rights to the lands within the territory as a matter of 
domestic law.
Second, contrary to what the Court of Appeal seems to assume, it is reasonably 
clear that the references in the Treaty of 1726 to the British Crown’s “just titles” to 
Nova Scotia, its rightful possession of the Province and its “Jurisdiction and Dominion” 
there uniformly address the question of the Crown’s international title to the territory 
and its succession to the claims of the King of France under the Treaty of Utrecht in 
1713.84 They do not deal with the question of aboriginal land rights, nor do they 
suggest that the Crown has an unencumbered property right to the lands of Nova Scotia 
under domestic law to the exclusion of aboriginal title.
Third, as noted above, British and Canadian courts have accepted the view that 
where the Crown acquires an inhabited territory, the change of sovereignty is governed 
by a principle of continuity. Under this principle, the existing property rights of the 
local inhabitants presumptively survive the change of sovereignty and are recognizable 
in the courts established by the new sovereign. So, in the absence of valid acts to the 
contrary, the land rights of the aboriginal peoples of Nova Scotia were not abrogated 
by the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 or the Treaty of 1726 but continued to exist under the 
aegis of the British Crown. This conclusion is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s 
rulings, discussed earlier, that the burden of proving the extinguishment of aboriginal 
title rests on the party alleging extinguishment, and that the intent to extinguish must 
be expressed in language that is clear and plain.
Finally, the continuing existence of aboriginal title in the old Province of Nova 
Scotia is confirmed by the well-known Proclamation issued by the British Crown on 
October 7th, 1763. The Proclamation recognized that unsurrendered lands in the 
possession of the Indian nations living under the Crown’s protection were reserved to 
them and could only be ceded to the Crown in a public treaty concluded with the Indian 
nation in question. Careful consideration of the Proclamation in its historical context 
supports the conclusion that its principal Indian provisions applied to Nova Scotia.85 
While a detailed review of the relevant materials cannot be given here, one piece of 
historical evidence seems particularly telling. Shortly after the Proclamation's issue, 
the British government forwarded a copy of the document to the Governor of Nova 
Scotia for publication. The Governor responded in these terms:
A few days since, I had the Honour of Your Lordship’s letters dated the 10th and 11th of 
October, the former containing His Majesty’s Commands, for publishing the Royal 
Proclamation relative to the new conquer’d Countries in America: which was
MFor fuller consideration of the issues relating to the Crown’s acquisition of Nova Scotia, see 
Slattery, “The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples”, supra, note 38, at 126-48.
“The scope of the Proclamation is considered in detail in Slattery, ibid. at 191-282.
immediately done here, and will very shortly be effected in the distant and remote parts 
of this Government.86
The point, of course, is not that the Proclamation is the source of aboriginal title in 
modem New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, but simply that it confirms the continued 
existence of aboriginal title in these Provinces.
So, in conclusion, I suggest that we should take the Court of Appeal’s remarks on 
aboriginal title in the Peter Paul case with a grain of salt. New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia cannot claim immunity from the general principles laid down more than a 
quarter-century ago in the Colder case, principles that have been reiterated and clarified 
by the Supreme Court in a series of authoritative cases culminating in the recent 
decision in Delgamuukw. Although most of these cases originated in other parts of 
Canada, the basic principles recognized by the Supreme Court are general in scope and 
apply to the whole of Canada.
To my mind, then, the question of aboriginal title in New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia is very much alive and will continue to preoccupy the courts of those provinces 
for some years to come. Perhaps the governments of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia 
would be wise to read the judicial writing on the wall and take steps to resolve the 
matter by timely negotiations.
“Quoted in Slattery, ibid. at 247; for further evidence of the Proclamation's application in Nova 
Scotia, see ibid. at 247-50.
